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Fukushima Was A Man Made Nuclear Mega Disaster, And It Was Predicted Many Years Before It Actually Happened; The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

This article pulls quotes from the Diet report, and adds titles to the different quotes to clarify and illuminate the subject matter further. To see the complete report, click on the link at the end of this article.

FUKUSHIMA MEGA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, REGULATORS AND TEPCO, AND LACK OF TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE

Fukushi; A “manmade” disaster
The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade.” We believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific individual. (see Recommendation 1)

The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011. But the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator (TEPCO), the regulatory bodies (NISA and NSC) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release.

TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) were aware of the need for structural reinforcement in order to conform to new guidelines, but rather than demanding their implementation, NISA stated that action should be taken autonomously by the operator.

NONE OF THE REQUIRED EARTHQUAKE REINFORCEMENTS HAD BEEN INSTALLED ON UNITS 1 - 3, DUE TO NISA REFUSING TO DO IT'S JOB


The Commission has discovered that no part of the required reinforcements had been implemented on Units 1 through 3 by the time of the accident. This was the result of tacit consent by NISA for a significant delay by the operators in completing the reinforcement. In addition, although NISA and the operators were aware of the risk of core damage from tsunami, no regulations were created, nor did TEPCO take any protective steps against such an occurrence.

TEPCO CLAIMS THAT TSUNAMI WAS SOLE CAUSE OF MULTIPLE 100 PERCENT MELTDOWNS, BUT THAT IS NOT A SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSION


We conclude that TEPCO was too quick to cite the tsunami as the cause of the nuclear accident and deny that the earthquake caused any damage. We believe there is a possibility that the earthquake damaged equipment necessary for ensuring safety, and that there is also a possibility that a small-scale LOCA occured in Unit 1. We hope these points will be examined further by a third party.

Several TEPCO vendor workers who were working on the fourth floor of the nuclear reactor building at Unit 1 at the time of the earthquake witnessed a water leak on the same floor, which houses two large tanks for the isolation condenser (IC) and the piping for IC. The Commission believes that this was not due to water sloshing out of the spent fuel pool on the fifth floor. However, since we cannot go inside the facility and perform an on-site inspection, the source of the water remains unconfirmed. 5. The isolation condensers (A and B2 systems) of Unit 1 were shut down automatically at 14:52, but the operator of Unit 1 manually stopped both IC systems 11 minutes later.

TEPCO has consistently maintained that the explanation for the manual suspension was that “it was judged that the per-hour reactor coolant temperature excursion rate could not be kept within 55 degrees (Celsius), which is the benchmark provided by the operational manual.” The government-led investigation report, as well as the government’s report to IAEA, states the same reason. However, according to several workers involved in the manual suspension of IC who responded to our investigation, they stopped IC to check whether coolant was leaking from IC and other pipes because the reactor pressure was falling rapidly.

While the operator’s explanations are reasonable and appropriate, TEPCO’s explanation is irrational. 6. There is no evidence that the safety relief (SR) valve was opened at Unit 1, though this should have taken place in the case of an accident. (Such records are available for Units 2 and 3.) We found that the sound of the SR valve opening for Unit 2 was heard at the Central Control Room and at Unit 2, but no one working at Unit 1 heard the sound of the Unit 1 SR valve opening. It is therefore a possibility that the SR valve might not have worked in Unit 1. In this case, a minor LOCA caused by the seismic motion could have taken place in Unit 1.

TEPCO AND GOVERNMENT FAILED TO INFORM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND DID NOT DISCLOSE SEVERITY OF FUKUSHIMA MEGA DISASTER


The central government was not only slow in informing municipal governments about the nuclear power plant accident, but also failed to convey the severity of the accident. Similarly, the speed of information in the evacuation areas varied significantly depending on the distance from the plant. Specifically, only 20 percent of the residents of the town hosting the plant knew about the accident when evacuation from the 3km zone was ordered at 21:23 on the evening of March 11.

EVACUATION ORDER DETAILS CHAOTIC, SOME RESIDENTS 'EVACUATED' INTO ZONES OF EVEN HIGHER RADIATION, SOME FORCED TO EVACUATE OR MOVE MULTIPLE TIMES DUE TO CHAOTIC SITUATION


Most residents within 10 km of the plant learned about the accident when the evacuation order was issued at 5:44 on March 12, more than 12 hours after the Article 15 notification—but received no further explanation of the accident or evacuation directions. Many residents had to flee with only the barest necessities and were forced to move multiple times or to areas with high radiation levels. There was great confusion over the evacuation, caused by prolonged shelter-in-place orders and voluntary evacuation orders. 

Some residents were evacuated to high dosage areas because radiation monitoring information was not provided. Some people evacuated to areas with high levels of radiation and were then neglected, receiving no further evacuation orders until April.


CHAOTIC EVACUATION ORDERS



http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf

The Commission’s investigation revealed that many residents were unaware that the accident had occured, or of its drastic escalation and the radiation leakage, even after the government and some municipalities were informed. As the damage from the accident began to escalate, evacuation destinations and other evacuation details were often revised.

But, even during the escalation, most nearby residents remained unaware of the accident and its severity, not to mention the potential for increased danger. A total of 146,520 residents were evacuated as a result of the government’s evacuation orders. However, many residents in the plant’s vacinity evacuated without accurate information.

Unaware of the severity of the accident, they planned to be away only for a few days and evacuated with only the barest necessities. Evacuation orders were repeatedly revised as the evacuation zones expanded from the original 3-kilometer radius to 10 kilometers and later, 20 kilometers, all in one day.

http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf

Each time the evacuation zone expanded, the residents were required to relocate. Some evacuees were unaware that they had been relocated to sites with high levels of radiation. Hospitals and nursing homes in the 20-kilometer zone struggled to secure evacuation transportation and find accommodations; 60 patients died in March from complications related to the evacuation.

Frustration among the residents increased. On March 15, residents in the zone between 20 and 30 kilometers from the plant were ordered to shelter-in-place. Since the order lasted for several weeks, these residents suffered greatly from a lack of communication and necessities. As a result, the shelter-in-place order was then revised to voluntary evacuation. 

Again, information on the basis for revising the evacuation order was sadly lacking, and residents found themselves having to make evacuation decisions without the necessary facts. The Commission concludes that the government effectively abandoned their responsibility for public safety. The fact that some areas within the 30-kilometer zone suffered from high radiation levels was known after the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) data was released on March 23. 

But neither the government nor the nuclear emergency response headquarters made a quick decision to evacuate residents from those areas; it was only one month later that they were evacuated. Lack of preparation for a nuclear disaster The regulators had become aware of a number of issues concerning nuclear disaster preparedness prior to the accident, but did not review disaster prevention measures.

As a result, delays in taking action contributed to the inappropriate response seen during the accident. The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) started reviewing the disaster-prevention guidelines in 2006 to accommodate new international standards. However, NSC was apprehensive that the residents could become concerned by the necessity of additional defense measures after being repeatedly assured of the safety of nuclear power, and that their worries might spill over to arguments against the plutonium-thermal project then in progress. 

TEPCO DID NOT TAKE PROPER ACTIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC AND DO THE RIGHT THING ALL BY ITSELF, DUE TO PRO NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 'CAPTURE'


TEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying and relying upon the government bureaucracy of METI, the government agency driving nuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the FEPC, it manipulated the cozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations. (see Recommendation 4)

The existing regulations primarily are biased toward the promotion of a nuclear energy policy, and not to public safety, health and welfare. The unambiguous responsibility that operators should bear for a nuclear disaster was not specified. There was also no clear guidance about the responsibilities of the related parties in the case of an emergency. The defense-indepth concept used in other countries has still not been fully considered.

The Commission believes the root causes of this accident cannot be resolved and that the people’s confidence cannot be recovered as long as this “manmade disaster” is seen as the result of error by a specific individual. The underlying issue is the social structure that results in “regulatory capture,” and the organizational, institutional, and legal framework that allows individuals to justify their own actions, hide them when inconvenient, and leave no records in order to avoid responsibility.

NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY FOUND TO BE ARROGANT AND IGNORANT FROM TOP TO BOTTOM


Across the board, the Commission found ignorance and arrogance unforgivable for anyone or any organization that deals with nuclear power. We found a disregard for global trends and a disregard for public safety. We found a habit of adherence to conditions based on conventional procedures and prior practices, with a priority on avoiding risk to the organization. We found an organization-driven mindset that prioritized benefits to the organization at the expense of the public.


LITTLE OR NO RADIATION MONITORING WAS DONE ONCE THE MEGA DISASTER STARTED, NO MECHANISM FOR MAKING SURE RADIATION MONITORS KEPT ON WORKING DESPITE LOSS OF POWER OR OTHER UNUSUAL CONDITIONS


Fukushima Prefecture also was unable to conduct emergency monitoring. Only one of the 24 fixed monitoring posts was still working; the others were either washed away or were no longer connected. Mobile monitoring posts were unusable until March 15 due to problems with the mobile telephone network. There was one vehicle equipped with monitoring equipment, but this was also out of action due to a lack of fuel.

IT TOOK ONE MONTH TO EVACUATE PEOPLE FROM ZONES OF HIGH RADIATION, DESPITE GOVERNMENT AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY KNOWING ABOUT THIS


There are now vast stretches of land.....of Fukushima Prefecture with levels equaling a potentially cumulative dose of 5mSv/year or more.

The fact that some areas within the 30-kilometer zone suffered from high radiation levels was known after the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) data was released on March 23. But neither the government nor the nuclear emergency response headquarters made a quick decision to evacuate residents from those areas; it was only one month later that they were evacuated.


A DYSFUNCTIONAL, UNHEALTHY AND PROFIT MOTIVATED RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN OPERATORS, REGULATORS AND ACADEMIC SCHOLARS


The Commission’s examination of the way safety regulations are deliberated and amended reveals a cozy relationship between the operators, the regulators and academic scholars that can only be described as totally inappropriate. In essence, the regulators and the operators prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety, and decided that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations “will not be stopped.”

Because the regulators and operators have consistently and loudly maintained that “the safety of nuclear power is guaranteed,” they had a mutual interest in averting the risk of existing reactors being shut down due to safety issues, or of lawsuits filed by anti-nuclear activists. They repeatedly avoided, compromised or postponed any course of action, and any regulation or finding that threatened the continued operation of nuclear reactors.

THE PRO NUCLEAR FEPC WAS RESPONSIBLE AT THE TOP OF THE PYRAMID OF POWER, FOR MAINTAINING THIS DYSFUNCTIONAL, PROFIT MINDED MONOPOLY HOLD ON POWER, NO MATTER WHAT THE COST



The FEPC has been the main organization through which this intransigent position was maintained among the regulatory agencies and in the academic world. Our investigation focused on the significant lobbying role taken by FEPC on behalf of the operators, and scrutinized the relationship between the operators and regulators. The Commission found that the actual relationship lacked independence and transparency, and was far from being a “safety culture.” 

In fact, it was a typical example of “regulatory capture,” in which the oversight of the industry by regulators effectively ceases. We found examples of this in the neutering of revisions in the Guideline for Anti-seismic Design, and the improper discussions that took place on regulating severe accident countermeasures.

PRIOR TO FUKUSHIMA DISASTER, THE SOLE AND PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LAWS AROUND NUCLEAR WAS TO PROMOTE THE INDUSTRY, AND NOTHING ELSE MATTERED


Prior to the accident, the primary purpose of the nuclear laws and regulations was the promotion of nuclear energy. The laws need to be rewritten with emphasis placed on prioritizing public safety, health and welfare. The roles, responsibilities and relationships of the operators, regulators and other involved entities need to be clearly delineated in the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.

The defense-in-depth needs to be formally enshrined in the regulations so that it will function properly when needed in the future. The accident has highlighted the need for sweeping, fundamental reform of said laws and regulations to bring them into line with international standards, make use of cuttingedge technical knowledge and learn from other accidents around the world. It is necessary to create a system wherein regulators have an ongoing obligation to insure that the laws and regulations reflect changing international standards.

A mechanism for monitoring the resulting infrastructural implementations must be devised. Once such new systems, laws and regulations are established, they must then be retroactively applied to existing reactors. It should be explicitly stated in the laws that reactors that do not meet the new standards should be decommissioned or otherwise dealt with appropriately.

COMMENTS BY RESIDENTS AROUND EVACUATION ORDERS


(i) Comment by a resident of Minamisoma “In Haramachi in Minamisoma, we were told to ‘stay at home,’ and were never once told to evacuate. On TV, all they said was ‘there are no immediate health effects,’ making us even more afraid. Nothing has changed since the accident occurred. When there is very little progress in decontamination, it is too strange that the evacuation order has been lifted already. The government should think more about the local people.” (ii) Comment by a resident in Kawauchi (20km-30 km area) “On March 11, immediately after hearing first news of the accident, many people in the village evacuated to this area. Young people were emailing ‘evacuate’ to each other, almost like chain mail. However, we did not receive any official information on the evacuation. We were only told to stay indoors through the emergency radio system. After hearing a neighbor who has a policeman in his family say, ‘I’m going to evacuate because it seems dangerous,’ I decided to evacuate. I heard that the police had left Kawauchi by March 14. The volunteers who were giving out food had used up the remaining gasoline for their transportation. I wanted them to help us evacuate as early as possible. I can only think that they abandoned us.”

(iii) Comment by a resident of Iitate “This area did not receive any information on the early stages of the nuclear accident. We heard about the radiation level only after the IAEA research team came in. Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano repeatedly said on TV that the radiation level ‘will not have immediate health effects.’ The reality is that residents in Iitate were exposed to radiation until April 22 (when the planned evacuation was ordered). It has been a year since then but we have received no damage compensation and the government is trying to cover it up by lifting the evacuation orders.”

While we only had TV as a source of information without accurate information or an idea of how the accident would develop, the minister in charge kept stating ‘it will not affect health immediately…’ TEPCO kept talking about the safety and reliability of the reactors… I am disgusted at the low quality of people in charge of this country.”

(v) Comment by a resident of Kawamata “They went on to say that there is no immediate effect, but the evacuation was explained on April 16. If they explained earlier, I could have found a specific place to evacuate. Although it was a large disaster, the response was too slow. The most important initial response based on the facts of the actual situation was not present and no orders based on ‘measures in conformity’ were given. I demand preparedness for emergency situations. All I saw was the politicians play party politics even though the nation is confronted with an unprecedented disaster. I question the humanity of those people. It is unfortunate that it was the nation who chose those people to be in charge.”

Residents who evacuated to areas which later became evacuation zones. Approximately 50 percent of the residents of Namie temporarily evacuated to areas with high concentrations of radiation.

Number of evacuations

In the year after the accidents, the residents nearest the plant had to evacuate a number of times. Approximately 70 percent of the residents of Futaba, Okuma, Tomioka, Naraha and Namie had to evacuate four times or more.

The government was slow in disclosing monitoring information.

(i) Residents of Namie “Even if we return to Namie the tiles on our roof have fallen off and radiation contaminated rain comes in. These are not conditions in which we can live. Every time I return, I feel angry. Our younger son also says that it is impossible for us to live here anymore. On the afternoon of March 11, when we were just about to patch the roof we were told to evacuate to the gym of the nearby Tsushima school. We stayed in the school for 3 or 4 days. It was a place with high radiation levels. We moved six places inside and outside of the prefecture and finally stopped after coming here.” (Nihonmatsu)

(ii) Comment by a resident of Futaba “On March 12, our hotel did not have electricity or water. We were allowed to stay in an old hotel and they shared gasoline with us. Our son is in Saitama Prefecture and he let us stay there for four months. Currently, we are living together as a family of four. When we visited our house briefly on March 6, my husband suffered from shock when he realized that he could not return to the house he was born in and is currently in hospital. We are frustrated with the irresponsibility and dishonesty of the politics of this country and TEPCO.”

(iii) Comment by a resident of Naraha “When I attended a lecture for local residents by TEPCO soon after the company hid an accident from the public, TEPCO said they not only had the first 3 layers of protection, but also the 4th and 5th layers of measures for safety, with an attitude that the attending residents would not understand what it means to have so many layers for safety. Now I realize all of what TEPCO explained was lies, and that I was deceived.

(v) Comment by a resident of Katsurao “We used to watch TV advertisements every day claiming that nuclear power costs less and is safe and clean energy. With vivid memories of such a message, we could not believe the accident happened, nor could we imagine a tsunami bringing on the tragedy. We still live in cramped temporary housing after more than a year. We have no idea when we can go back to our home. We absolutely oppose the re-commissioning of reactors. No new reactors should be allowed, and we must shift to renewable energy. Laws and regulations for such plans need to be established quickly. The government should accelerate the progress of compensation for accident damage. It is not like compensation for a traffic accident…. I am tired of my current living conditions. I demand that the government step forward to take responsibility and make every effort to compensate the victims. I am counting on the government.”


SUBCONTRACTED WORKERS ON SITE AT FUKUSHIMA DID NOT RECEIVE ANY INFORMATION THAT THE SITE COULD BE DANGEROUSLY RADIOACTIVE AND A HAZARD TO THEIR HEALTH


Approximately 40 percent of TEPCO workers received a warning that the reactors were or could be in a dangerous state. On the other hand, hardly any workers from the subcontracted companies said that they received such a warning.

"I later told a general manager of TEPCO that I wanted to pull out, but it was very hard to get his consent. We found that the company car we were planning to use had been taken by TEPCO employees, but a colleague gave us a ride. I repeatedly requested a whole body check from my employer in late March and April, but my request was always denied. I was assigned to work at Daiichi at the end of April, which I refused to do because of health concerns. As a result I was later subjected to power harassment from my employer and I became mentally unbalanced. Because of this, I had to leave the company in June, which they termed a ‘resignation for personal reasons.’ ”

Comment by a subordinate contractor employee

“On the news it was reported that the plant workers who were dealing with the accident were prepared to die, but I was watching the news, thinking that there is no way we were ready to die. I did a whole body check for the first time at the end of April, and my radiation dosage was unbelievably high. My heart goes out to the people who are still working to deal with the accident. I hope that the people working at Fukushima Daiichi will take care of their health.”

The anger of the evacuees:

We felt the raw anger of the residents as shown by the following comments: “We had to evacuate without any information from the government, the prefecture, or TEPCO about the accident itself, instructions on the evacuation, or in which direction we should evacuate.” “There should have been someone, such as a TEPCO employee, providing information at earlier stage.”
Source; The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf

AGR SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF REPORT ABOVE

This report and investigation points at some problems and issues (which is a positive) and they are quoted above. In many cases though, the report did not go into the issues involved around Fukushima deep enough. The report was like getting an appetizer, for a 12 course dinner. There was a LOT missing from this supposed in depth report. Maybe they need to teach how to do an in depth investigation at the colleges and schools over there?

For example, although the report says TEPCO's claim that the earthquake had nothing to do with the meltdowns is premature and potentially false, it did not go into any details or investigate this claim beyond a cursory very shallow attempt, with almost nothing behind it.

Massive 9.0 Earthquake Caused Multiple Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Reactors To Meltdown And Out in 2011 Unit 1 Was Smoking Before Tsunami Hit Plant, According To Workers There, Other NPP's Vulnerable
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2013/09/massive-90-earthquake-caused-multiple.html

The report repeats the false nuclear industry claim that Fukushima was only a small fraction of Chernobyl, despite MULTIPLE reactors melting down, like the one blowing up in a massive black, purple and orange mushroom cloud. 

Worst Case Scenario Around The Fukushima Mega Nuclear Disaster Based On Actual Data And Evidence, Vs Best Case Computer Estimates Presented By Nuclear Industry But Without Evidence Or Real Data
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2015/10/worst-case-scenario-around-fukushima.html

The report also avoids all mention about how TEPCO did not even announce or admit that there were completely meltdowns in multiple reactors until MONTHS down the road. The total avoidance of this basic FACT makes the whole report seem much weaker and impotent than it could be. The whole world knows this basic fact, and the report ignores this completely. The report also does not give ANY specific HIGH radiation readings, in spite of them being easily accessible and available. 

Timeline of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster Events, Explosions, Venting - 3 Month Delay In Announcing Meltdowns, Greenpeace Measured 10,000 Counts PER SECOND Radiation After Meltdowns
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2014/06/timeline-of-fukushima-evacuations-10.html

The report avoids going into details about spent fuel pool melt downs and fires. It avoids all mention of the #3 explosion, which was obviously NOT HYDROGEN. 

What Really Happened At #3 Fukushima Reactor And Spent Fuel Pool #3? Multiple Nuclear Experts Interviewed
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2016/04/what-really-happened-at-3-fukushima.html

It avoids all mention of where the corium from multiple meltdowns ended up going, potentially into the ground. It avoids all mention of highly radioactive water leaking and/or being dumped into the ocean, from 3/11 to present day. It avoids all mention of the failures around 'decommissioning' and the basic fact that this site is still in an emergency state, and has not been 'shut down' as TEPCO claims.

Is Fukushima really in cold shutdown?
http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2012/03/fukushima-is-it-really-in-cold-shutdown.html

Ex Fukushima Engineer Confesses; No Cold Shutdown, Warned of Tsunami 20 Yrs Ago
http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2012/04/ex-fukushima-engineer-confesses-no-cold.html

Radioactive Smoke/Steam Coming Out Of Ground And #3 Reactor Building At Fukushima
http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2012/02/tokyo-alert-severe-radioactive-smoke.html

Japan Radioactive Iodine 131 In Sewage Sludge Levels RISING Since March 2011 To 2014 - Why
http://agreenroad.blogspot.com/2013/09/iodine-131-in-sewage-sludge-amounts.html

At Fukushima Daichi, 3 Or More Coriums Melted Out Of Containment Into Ground, Compared To 1 At Chernobyl - China Syndrome, Ongoing Criticalities Quite Possible, Evidence, Data Supports It
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2016/05/at-fukushima-daichi-3-or-more-coriums.html

Even these issues, as troubling as they are, consist of just the tip of the iceberg in terms of what could have been included in this report. Instead, these MOST SERIOUS ISSUES were whitewashed, denied, covered up, or ignored completely.

But what does one expect from a government commission report, especially when the Japanese Mafia is involved and they can and do just disappear any or all investigators or reporters, if they get too close to the truth? The best strategy for this commission was to whitewash, cover up and stay alive.

Via or-well September 16, 2016 author has written a lot on Jp nuke/yakuza connections over at Japan Subculture Research Center.
http://www.japansubculture.com/first-arrest-of-nuclear-mafia/

http://www.japansubculture.com/dear-yakuza-ex-convicts-deadbeats-youre-welcome-at-japans-nuclear-power-plants-just-let-us-know-okay/

It is best not to even mention the weaponized hot nano particles that everyone inhaled all across the planet, and that are also being injected/leaked into the Pacific daily. Also, don't mention that the ice wall is a huge failure, despite them 'trying' to make it work for the last four years or so.. The ICE WALL is symbolic of the wall of denial, suppression of the truth, and total disregard for human health that the nuclear industry has. Building walls around the truth does not work, and there are always 'leaks'. 

Weaponized Fukushima Fallout: Radioactive Fullerenes and Endofullerenes

Fukushima Hot Particle (Fuel Flea) Found 150 Miles Away in Tokyo, Measured At 40 Quintillion Bq/kg, Arnie Gundersen Reports That Seattle Residents Breathed In 5 Hot Particles Per Day
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2012/04/hot-particles-from-fukushima-continue.html

Meanwhile, Fukushima Province, where these hot particles are the most numerous and concentrated, hosted 10 million tourists last year, which is pretty close to what they had before this mega nuclear disaster. Most of what happened and is still happening at Fukushima Daichi is still being covered up, denied and ignored by the mass media, as well as by supposed commissions and government investigators.

Source/credit; Troy Livingston

Little do these tourists know that their risk of inhaling some of this hot particles is VERY HIGH, and that once one or more of these radioactive hot particles lodge somewhere in the body, it is like a miniature machine gun going off, and it NEVER STOPS FIRING, damaging DNA and killing or damaging cells all around it. Guess what initiates Big C? One or more hot particles. DOH!


Hot particles measured at Diablo Canyon, in California USA in 2011.. Yes, those Fukushima hot particles were breathed in by US babies, teens, adults and seniors, but no one wants you to know tha either.. Shhhhh, keep it quiet and don't you dare tell anyone about anything. Fact is, odds are great that if you dare to talk about any of this, most people will give you a strange look, and then walk away, or tell you to shut up, because that is just a conspiracy theory.


Join the revolution, if you dare...

EXPOSING FUKUSHIMA LIES; HUMANERROR MUSIC/SONG


Via Jebus September 16, 2016 English subs…

Exposing Fukushima Lies – humanERROR
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zHh7mJVi6E

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Fukushima Was A Man Made Nuclear Mega Disaster, And It Was Predicted Many Years Before It Actually Happened; The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
http://www.agreenroadjournal.com/2016/09/fukushima-was-man-made-disaster-and-it.html

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